If We're Losing, Here's How It Happened

So, the bipartisan Iraq Study Group report was released last Wednesday, and although most Americans (and much of the world) are interested in what it has to say, who has time to sift through all 160-plus pages? Well, lucky for you I did as I wound out the clock last Friday before the holiday party at my work got going. I'm gonna try really, really hard this time to just cut to the point and not drone on and on like certain other entries in the short-lived history of my blog.
To answer the main question posing us now, which is how we proceed, the report offers a couple of solutions. The biggest of which is that we need to engage Syria and Iran in particular in assisting the quelling of the insurrection (as opposed to assisting the insurrection itself, as they are currently doing). They also suggest that the resolution of the long-standing Israel-Palestine dispute is central to solving the current problem and stabilizing the region. Finally, they are advocating that American forces be integrated into existing Iraqi forces (both the military and the police) rather than our current system of having separate Iraqi and American forces. There are a grand total of 79 recommendations, so certainly they offer a lot more on a much broader range of issues than just these 3, but if you want the "quick and dirty" version, I think that sums it up pretty well.

The report itself is very easy to read, and if you have any interest whatsoever in foreign affairs you should definitely read it for yourself and draw your own conclusions. Without the appendices it's roughly 100 pages, although the pages are pretty small by normal book standards. The average person could probably knock it out in about 2-3 hours.

What I think is most revealing from the report is not the proposal of where we go from here but the very frank and grave assessment of the deteriorating situation as it stands today. Certainly a great many pundits, journalists, and just about everyone else has reported and commented on how bad things are, but the fact that this comes directly from a bipartisan government commission is something new and almost unprecedented as far as I know. But rather than paraphrase what I found to be most enlightening, I'll just quote the report itself:

On the Iraqi army:
"Significant questions remain about the ethnic composition and loyalties of some Iraqi units—specifically, whether they will carry out missions on behalf of national goals instead of a sectarian agenda. Of Iraq’s 10 planned divisions, those that are even-numbered are made up of Iraqis who signed up to serve in a specific area, and they have been reluctant to redeploy to other areas of the country. As a result, elements of the Army have refused to carry out missions."

"Units lack personnel. Soldiers are on leave one week a month so that they can visit their families and take them their pay. Soldiers are paid in cash because there is no banking
system. Soldiers are given leave liberally and face no penalties for absence without leave. Unit readiness rates are low, often at 50 percent or less."

On the Iraqi police:
"The state of the Iraqi police is substantially worse than that of the Iraqi Army. The Iraqi Police Service currently numbers roughly 135,000 and is responsible for local policing. It has neither the training nor legal authority to conduct criminal investigations, nor the firepower to take on organized crime, insurgents, or militias. . . Iraqi police cannot control crime, and they routinely engage in sectarian violence, including the unnecessary detention, torture, and targeted execution of Sunni Arab civilians."

"There are ample reports of Iraqi police officers participating in training in order to obtain a weapon, uniform, and ammunition for use in sectarian violence. Some are on the payroll but don’t show up for work."

" The Facilities Protection Service poses additional problems. Each Iraqi ministry has an armed unit, ostensibly to guard the ministry’s infrastructure. In the ministries of Health, Agriculture, and Transportation—controlled by Moqtada al-Sadr—the Facilities Protection Service is a source of funding and jobs for the Mahdi Army. One senior U.S. official described the Facilities Protection Service as “incompetent, dysfunctional, or subversive.” Several Iraqis simply referred to them as militias."

On the sectarian violence:
"U.S. forces can “clear” any neighborhood, but there are neither enough U.S. troops present nor enough support from Iraqi security forces to “hold” neighborhoods so cleared. The same holds true for the rest of Iraq. Because none of the operations conducted by U.S. and Iraqi military forces are fundamentally changing the conditions encouraging the sectarian violence, U.S. forces
seem to be caught in a mission that has no foreseeable end."

"The composition of the Iraqi government is basically sectarian, and key players within the government too often act in their sectarian interest. Iraq’s Shia, Sunni, and Kurdish leaders
frequently fail to demonstrate the political will to act in Iraq’s national interest, and too many Iraqi ministries lack the capacity to govern effectively."

"The Shia, the majority of Iraq's population, have gained power for the first time in more than 1,300 years"

"Sunnis are confronted by paradoxes: they have opposed the presence of U.S. forces in Iraq but need those forces to protect them against Shia militias; they chafe at being governed by a majority Shia administration but reject a federal, decentralized Iraq and do not see a Sunni
autonomous region as feasible for themselves."

"First, Sunni Arabs are generally Iraqi nationalists, albeit within the context of an Iraq they believe they should govern. Second, because Iraq’s energy resources are in the Kurdish and Shia regions, there is no economically feasible “Sunni region.” Particularly contentious is a provision in the constitution that shares revenues nationally from current oil reserves, while allowing revenues from reserves discovered in the future to go to the regions."

"Another key unresolved issue is the future of Kirkuk, an oil-rich city in northern Iraq that is home to substantial numbers of Kurds, Arabs, and Turkmen. The Kurds insisted that the constitution require a popular referendum by December 2007 to determine whether Kirkuk can formally join the Kurdish administered region, an outcome that Arabs and Turkmen in Kirkuk staunchly oppose. The risks of further violence sparked by a Kirkuk referendum are great."

"Iraq’s leaders often claim that they do not want a division of the country, but we found that key Shia and Kurdish leaders have little commitment to national reconciliation."

On the judicial system:
"corruption is rampant. One senior Iraqi official estimated that official corruption costs Iraq $5–7 billion per year."

"There are still no examples of senior officials who have been brought before a court of law and convicted on corruption charges."

"Intimidation of the Iraqi judiciary has been ruthless. As one senior U.S. official said to us, “We can protect judges, but not their families, their extended families, their friends.” Many Iraqis feel that crime not only is unpunished, it is rewarded."

On international aid:
"International donors pledged $13.5 billion to support reconstruction, but less than $4 billion has been delivered."

On problems with Iran and Syria:
"Iran has provided arms, financial support, and training for Shiite militias within Iraq, as well as political support for Shia parties. There are also reports that Iran has supplied improvised
explosive devices to groups—including Sunni Arab insurgents—that attack U.S. forces."

"Iran appears content for the U.S. military to be tied down in Iraq, a position that limits U.S. options in addressing Iran’s nuclear program and allows Iran leverage over stability in
Iraq."

"The Syrian role is not so much to take active measures as to countenance malign neglect:
the Syrians look the other way as arms and foreign fighters flow across their border into Iraq, and former Baathist leaders find a safe haven within Syria. Like Iran, Syria is content to see
the United States tied down in Iraq. That said, the Syrians have indicated that they want a dialogue with the United States, and in November 2006 agreed to restore diplomatic relations with Iraq after a 24-year break."

Conclusions on the current situation:
"As of December 2006, nearly 2,900 Americans have lost their lives serving in Iraq. Another
21,000 Americans have been wounded, many severely. To date, the United States has spent roughly $400 billion on the Iraq War, and costs are running about $8 billion per
month. In addition, the United States must expect significant “tail costs” to come. Caring for veterans and replacing lost equipment will run into the hundreds of billions of dollars. Estimates
run as high as $2 trillion for the final cost of the U.S. involvement in Iraq.
Despite a massive effort, stability in Iraq remains elusive and the situation is deteriorating. The Iraqi government cannot now govern, sustain, and defend itself without the support of
the United States. Iraqis have not been convinced that they must take responsibility for their own future. Iraq’s neighbors and much of the international community have not been persuaded
to play an active and constructive role in supporting Iraq. The ability of the United States to shape outcomes is diminishing. Time is running out."

This one quote, though, sums up everything very effectively:
"To put it simply: there are many armed groups within Iraq, and very little will to lay down arms"